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Abstract

Textured Contact Lens Based Iris Presentation Attack In Uncontrolled Environment
Daksha Yadav
The widespread use of smartphones has spurred the research in mobile iris devices. Due to
their convenience, these mobile devices are also utilized in unconstrained outdoor conditions.
At the same time, iris recognition in the visible spectrum has developed into an active area
of research. These scenarios have necessitated the development of reliable iris recognition
algorithms for such an uncontrolled environment. Additionally, iris presentation attacks such
as textured contact lens pose a major challenge to current iris recognition systems.
Motivated by these factors, in this thesis, a detailed analysis of the effect of textured
contact lenses on iris recognition in an uncontrolled environment is presented by creating
Mobile Uncontrolled Iris Presentation Attack Database. It consists of more than 10,000
iris images of subjects wearing textured contact lens and without wearing contact lenses
captured in an indoor and outdoor environment using a mobile iris sensor. The first contact
lens database in the visible spectrum is also introduced, named as UVCLI database. Using
this database, a detailed analysis of the effect of textured contact lenses on iris recognition
in the visible spectrum is presented. It is observed that textured contact lenses degrade
the unconstrained iris recognition performance by over 25% and thus, may be utilized
intentionally or unintentionally to attack existing iris recognition systems. Also, the first study
to investigate the impact of textured contact lenses on identity impersonation is performed.
The results demonstrate that a perpetrator can impersonate an enrolled subject by wearing
the same textured contact lens.
This thesis also presents a novel algorithm, DensePAD, which utilizes DenseNet based
convolutional neural network architecture for the near-infrared spectrum based iris presentation attack detection. The proposed algorithm is trained on a combined iris database of more
than 270, 000 real and attack iris images. In-depth experimental evaluation of this algorithm
reveals its superior performance in detecting iris presentation attack images on the combined
iris database as well as the proposed MUIPAD.

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, who have always encouraged me to pursue my
dreams, especially this one . . .
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Iris based Biometric Authentication

Biometrics refers to the use of physical or behavioral traits (such as the face, iris, fingerprints,
and voice) for the purpose of establishing one’s unique identity [19]. A good biometric trait
exhibits traits such as universality, distinctiveness, permanence, and collectability. Iris is
one of the most reliable and accurate biometric modalities due to the highly unique property
of iris tissue structure. The iris tissue has rich textural information and is unique for each
individual as well as differs between two eyes of the same individual. Figure 1.1 illustrates
the different regions of an eye: sclera, iris, and pupil.
Daugman patented the first successful iris recognition algorithm [7]. His algorithm
was based on a test of statistical independence of the phase of Gabor wavelets fitted on a
grid of locations superimposed on a pseudo-polar transformation of the iris texture. That
basic design still remains the dominant iris recognition method. Traditional iris recognition
systems operate in the near-infrared (NIR) spectrum. During the iris image acquisition, the
light in the NIR spectrum permeates the surface of the eye and highlights the unique iris

1

1.1 Iris based Biometric Authentication

Iris
Pupil
Sclera

Figure 1.1: Illustrating the different regions of the human eye.
texture patterns. Due to its accuracy, iris recognition has been used successfully in numerous
applications including large-scale national identification projects and border security.
It is estimated that over 2.71 billion individuals are expected to own a smartphone by the
year 2019 [1]. This staggering growth of smartphones has contributed to the emerging field
of mobile biometrics with the increasing number of small factor biometric sensors. Apart
from the robust nature of traditional biometrics, mobile biometrics offer portability as a key
advantage [20]. The mobile nature of these sensors facilitates their deployment in a variety
of applications such as e-banking and authentication for e-commerce applications.
Research in visible spectrum iris recognition [18, 32, 38] has witnessed significant growth
in recent years and is being actively explored. Iris recognition in the visible spectrum can be
utilized for applications such as authentication in outdoor environments where near-infrared
iris images may be difficult to acquire. Visible spectrum iris recognition has also gained
popularity due to its potential application in the field of mobile biometrics [35, 39].
2

1.2 Motivation and Literature Review

1.2

Motivation and Literature Review

Due to the reliable nature of iris biometrics [28], iris sensors and recognition systems are
being made available in the new generation mobile smartphones [31]. This feature is proving
advantageous in many scenarios but has also introduced unforeseen research challenges. For
instance, acquisition of iris images may be challenging in outdoor locations during daytime
and in high illumination settings. Other challenges such as complexity of algorithms also
need to be considered in their deployment. However, the majority of the research is focusing
on the controlled environment and existing databases contain iris images captured using
traditional close-capture iris devices.
The surge of iris biometrics in authentication applications such as banking and ecommerce sectors has increased concerns about the ease of subversion of these systems by
determined adversaries. In the literature, researchers have demonstrated the impact of a
variety of presentation attacks on the near-infrared spectrum based iris recognition systems
such as print/scan attacks [15], textured contact lens [21], and synthetic irises [36]. Studies
have also focused on developing algorithms for detection of contact lenses in iris images
captured in NIR spectrum [9, 23, 40] (as shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2). In 2010, Baker et al.
[3] demonstrated that transparent/clear contact lenses with no visible texture cause a small
degradation in iris recognition performance. Later, Doyle et al. [9] and Kohli et al. [21]
showed that wearing textured/cosmetic contact lenses nearly guarantees a false non-match
output. Yadav et al. [40] created IIIT-Delhi Contact Lens Iris database and observed 22%38% reduction in iris verification performance when matching an image of an iris with no
contact lens with an iris image with a textured contact lens. Doyle and Bowyer [8] developed
ND-Contact-Lens-2015 database and proposed using binarized statistical image features for
detecting textured contact lenses in a given iris image. Apart from these databases, LivDet

3

1.2 Motivation and Literature Review
Table 1.1: Information about number of subjects, number of images, and the iris image
acquisition devices in the existing iris presentation attack databases since 2010.
Database
ND-Iris-Contact-Lens2010
[3]
ND-Contact-Lens2015
[8]
IIIT-Delhi Contact Lens
Iris Database [40]
IIIT-Delhi Iris Spoofing
Database [15]
ATVS-FIr [11]
LivDet-Iris-2013Warsaw
[41]
LivDet-Iris-2015Clarkson
[42]

No. of Subjects

No. of Images

Acquisition Device

211

21,700

LG2200

326

7,300

LG4000, AD100

101

6,570

CIS 202

101

4,848

50

1,600

284

1,667

45

3,726

HP Color LaserJet 2025
& CIS 202 (Iris Sensor)
LG IrisAccess
EOU3000
IrisGuard AD100, HP
LaserJet 1320, Lexmark
c534dn
LG IrisAccess
EOU2200

(liveliness detection) challenges [41, 42] have been conducted in the research community to
demonstrate recent challenges in texture contact lens detection.
Similar to NIR spectrum, various visible spectrum iris databases exist in the literature such
as UBIRIS.v2 [32], MICHE [26], mobile phone-based [39], and VSSIRIS [35]. However,
there is a distinct lack of attention towards the probability of presentation attacks in visible
spectrum based iris recognition and very few relevant studies exist. Recently, Raghavendra
and Busch [33] have demonstrated a video-replay presentation attack for iris recognition in
the visible spectrum using printed photos and electronic displays. Even though the textured
contact lens is becoming more popular with developments in low-cost technology, their
influence on iris recognition in visible spectrum has not been explored. The problem is
compounded by the non-existence of any visible spectrum iris database with annotated
4
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Table 1.2: Characteristics (type of presentation attacks and acquisition environment) of the
existing iris presentation attack databases.
Database
ND-Iris-Contact-Lens2010[3]
ND-Contact-Lens2015[8]
IIIT-Delhi Contact Lens
Iris Database[40]
IIIT-Delhi Iris Spoofing
Database[15]
ATVS-FIr [11]
LivDet-Iris-2013Warsaw[41]
LivDet-Iris-2015Clarkson[42]

Textured
Contact Lens

Print
Attack

Uncontrolled
Environment

Mobile
Sensor

✓

✗

✗

✗

✓

✗

✗

✗

✓

✗

✗

✗

✗

✓

✗

✗

✗

✓

✗

✗

✓

✓

✗

✗

✓

✓

✗

✗

information regarding subjects wearing textured contact lens. Moreover, it is imperative
to evaluate the effectiveness of these algorithms in detecting contact lenses in iris images
captured in unconstrained scenarios. Figure 1.2 highlights the transformations in the iris
texture patterns due to textured contact lenses and environmental variations in NIR and
visible spectrum.

1.3

Contributions of the Thesis

Presentation attacks are performed with the goal of obfuscating the true identity of the attacker
or impersonating a specific person. By obfuscation, one can achieve multiple enrollments
to avail facilities that utilize biometric recognition. Through impersonation, one can gain
access to the specific facilities available to a specific user. However, as shown in Table 1.2,
none of the existing databases have focused on (i) textured contact lenses, (ii) print attack,

5
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Real

Textured Contact Lens

Indoor

Outdoor

NIR Spectrum
Real

Textured Contact Lens

Indoor

Outdoor

Visible Spectrum
Figure 1.2: Illustrating the variations due to textured contact lenses and environmental
variations in near-infrared and visible spectrum iris images. (Best viewed in color)
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1.3 Contributions of the Thesis
(iii) uncontrolled environment, and (iv) data captured using a mobile device, simultaneously.
This research attempts to fill this gap by:
• introducing a novel database named as Mobile Uncontrolled Iris Presentation Attack
Database (MUIPAD). This database has with and without textured contact lens iris
images acquired in uncontrolled environmental variations. The images in the proposed
database have been acquired using a low form factor mobile iris scanner. This database
contains over 10,000 multi-session iris images, belonging to 70 eye classes. The
database includes corresponding printed iris images generated using two printers to
simulate the print attack. This is the first publicly available iris database offering a
unique combination of such variations.
• developing a new benchmark unconstrained visible spectrum contact lens iris database
termed as Unconstrained Visible Spectrum Contact Lens Iris (UVCLI) Database. The
proposed database consists of over 3,800 images, both real and with textured contact
lenses, pertaining to 70 iris classes. This database comprises multi-session images of
subjects captured in a controlled indoor environment as well as in an unconstrained
outdoor environment with variations in illumination. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first such publicly available visible spectrum database. Since the database
contains multiple images per class, it can also be utilized to create better iris recognition
algorithms in the visible spectrum.
• evaluating the effect of textured contact lenses on the performance of the existing
visible spectrum iris recognition algorithm using the proposed UVCLI database. The
influence of environmental variations at the time of image acquisition is also analyzed.
Therefore, the influence of two confounding variables: textured contact lenses and
environmental variations is examined.
7

1.3 Contributions of the Thesis
• presenting an in-depth analysis of the efficacy of textured contact lenses in accomplishing identity impersonation and identity obfuscation. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first study to examine if textured contact lenses can be utilized by adversaries for
both identity impersonation as well as obfuscation.
• demonstrating the performance of deep learning based features as well as existing
iris presentation attack detection techniques on the proposed MUIPAD database. The
impact of unknown environmental conditions and unknown contact lens manufacturer
on presentation attack detection is evaluated to simulate real-world scenarios. The
performance of existing iris presentation attack detection algorithms on the proposed
UVCLI database is benchmarked in detecting contact lenses in the visible spectrum
iris images.
• presenting a novel algorithm, DensePAD, which utilizes DenseNet based convolutional
neural network architecture for near-infrared spectrum based iris presentation attack
detection. The proposed algorithm is trained a combined iris database of more than
270, 000 real and attack iris images.

8

Chapter 2
Proposed Databases
The portable nature of mobile iris based systems enables their usage in outdoor scenarios.
However, acquiring iris images in uncontrolled settings may deteriorate the performance of
iris recognition systems. There is a need to develop databases which encompass iris images
acquired in unconstrained settings to facilitate the research in mobile iris recognition. Further,
the advent in cutting-edge technology has led to consumers being offered textured contact
lenses with diverse choices of colors and textures by different manufacturers. This illustrates
an urgent need to analyze if textured contact lenses can be utilized with a malicious intent to
impersonate or obfuscate one’s identity. Figure 2.1 illustrates the variations in iris occurring
due to the presence of textured contact lenses and uncontrolled environment.

2.1

Mobile Uncontrolled Iris Presentation Attack Database
(MUIPAD)

There is no database available to the research community which provides a combination of all
the aforementioned variations. This thesis presents the Mobile Uncontrolled Iris Presentation

9

2.1 Mobile Uncontrolled Iris Presentation Attack Database (MUIPAD)

Subject A

Subject B

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 2.1: Showcasing the variations in iris images due to textured contact lens and unconstrained environmental conditions. Figure (a): real iris images captured indoor, (b): real
iris images captured outdoor, (c): textured contact lens iris images captured indoor, and (d):
textured contact lens iris images captured outdoor.
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2.1 Mobile Uncontrolled Iris Presentation Attack Database (MUIPAD)
Attack Database (MUIPAD) to analyze the effect of uncontrolled environmental and textured
contact lenses on iris images captured using a mobile sensor. The database will be available
to the research community at http://iab-rubric.org/resources.html#iris to promote research in
this area.

2.1.1

Database Characteristics

The iris images in the proposed MUIPAD database have been acquired using the IriShield
MK2120U mobile sensor. For each subject in the database, images have been captured
indoors (controlled environment) and outdoors (uncontrolled environment) in a multi-session
protocol. In each session, with and without textured contact lens iris images of the subjects
are captured indoors as well as outdoors. It is also ensured that subjects are provided with
different textured contact lenses for the two sessions. It should be noted that the outdoor
images have been captured in varying time of the day and weather conditions. A minimum
of five images of each eye is acquired during each session. The time gap between the two
sessions is at least one day.
The textured contact lenses utilized in the proposed databases have been grouped into
the following categories based on the manufacturer: Freshlook Dailies (one-day disposable
lens), Freshlook Colorblends (weekly disposable lens), Bausch + Lomb Lacelle (monthly
disposable), Aryan 3-tone (yearly disposable), and Celebration (weekly disposable lens).
Additionally, print attack images have also been included in the proposed database. All
iris images (with and without textured contact lens) are printed using HP LaserJet Enterprise
P3015 (black and white) and Konica Minolta Bizhub C454E (colored). This is followed
by scanning of the printed images using Konica Minolta Bizhub C454E scanner. Thus, the
proposed database comprises 10,296 iris images from 35 subjects (18 males and 17 females)
with 70 eye classes. The subjects in the database belong to different ethnicities such as
11
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(UVCLI) Database
Table 2.1: Characteristics of the proposed Unconstrained Visible Contact Lens Iris (UVCLI)
database.
Spectrum
Environmental Variations

Visible
Multi-Session Acquisition Indoors and
Outdoors

Total Number of Images

3,802

Types of Images

Real (1,877) & Textured Contact Lens (1,925)
CIBA Vision Freshlook Colorblends; CIBA
Vision Dailies; Bausch & Lomb Lacelle; Aryan;
and Celebration

Contact Lens Brands
Number of Subjects (Classes)

35 (70)

Participant Gender

Females (17) & Males (18)

Caucasian and Asian. Figure 2.2 illustrates sample real, textured contact lens, and printed
iris images captured in uncontrolled environmental scenarios from the proposed database.

2.2

Unconstrained Visible Spectrum Contact Lens Iris
(UVCLI) Database

2.2.1

Database Characteristics

This thesis also presents the Unconstrained Visible Spectrum Contact Lens Iris (UVCLI)
database. The proposed UVCLI database consists of 3,802 iris images captured in the visible
spectrum at two locations: indoors (with controlled illumination) and outdoors (with varying
environmental scenarios) in two sessions. These images have been captured one at a time
using EOS 60D DSLR Canon camera with EFS 60mm f/2.8 Macro USM Fixed lens. In each
session of data acquisition, a minimum of six images of each eye when wearing textured
contact lens and a minimum of six images of each eye without any lens (real) are acquired.
These images are captured indoors and this process is repeated in the outdoor environment.
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2.2 Unconstrained Visible Spectrum Contact Lens Iris
(UVCLI) Database
Session 1

Real Indoor

Real Outdoor

Lens Indoor

Lens Outdoor

Corresponding Printed Images
Session 2

Real Indoor

Real Outdoor

Lens Indoor

Lens Outdoor

Corresponding Printed Images

Figure 2.2: Sample iris images of a subject from the proposed Mobile Uncontrolled Iris
Presentation Attack Database.

13

2.2 Unconstrained Visible Spectrum Contact Lens Iris
(UVCLI) Database

Session 1
Indoor

Outdoor

Real

Textured
Contact
Lens
Session 2

Real

Textured
Contact
Lens

Figure 2.3: Sample images of a subject from the proposed Unconstrained Visible Contact Lens Iris (UVCLI) database demonstrating the variations due to textured contact lens,
environmental conditions, and multi-session acquisition. (Best viewed in color)
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(UVCLI) Database
Outdoor images have been collected at varying times of the day (such as afternoon and night)
and varying weather conditions (such as sunny and cloudy). Majority of the first session
outdoor data is collected during the daytime.
The textured contact lenses utilized in this database belong to five different types: CIBA
Vision FreshLook Dailies1 , CIBA Vision Freshlook Colorblends, Bausch & Lomb Lacelle2 ,
Aryan 3-Tone, and Celebration. Varying colors such as pure hazel, turquoise, amethyst, and
gray have been selected to create a medley of texture patterns. Also, each participant is
provided with a texture contact lens from different manufacturers in different sessions.
In total, the database comprises of iris samples from 35 subjects (70 classes) with 17
females and 18 males between the age of 18-38 years. The database has participants belonging
to diverse ethnicities such as Asian, Caucasian, and Hispanic. Table 2.1 summarizes the
characteristics of the proposed UVCLI database and Figure 2.3 illustrates sample images of
an individual from the database. This new database can be utilized by the research community
for visible iris recognition in unconstrained scenarios and textured contact lens detection in
the visible spectrum.

1 http://www.freshlookcontacts.com/all-color-contacts/
2 http://www.bausch.com.my/en/our-products/contact-lenses/cosmetic-lenses/lacelle/
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Chapter 3
Influence of Uncontrolled Environment
and Textured Contact Lens on Iris
Recognition
Environmental variations may significantly impact the quality of the acquired iris image. Factors such as illumination intensity, particularly in daylight condition, can affect the acquisition
of iris images. Additionally, the presence of textured contact lenses also negatively impact
iris recognition performance. The effect of the textured contact lens on the performance of
iris recognition has been studied previously in the literature [10, 21, 40]. However, there is no
study evaluating the effect of uncontrolled environment jointly with textured contact lenses on
iris recognition systems. Therefore, in this chapter, the efficacy of NIR and visible spectrum
based iris recognition systems is evaluated in the presence of two factors: unconstrained
environment and textured contact lens using the proposed MUIPAD and UVCLI databases.

16

3.1 Effect of Uncontrolled Environment on NIR Iris Recognition

3.1

Effect of Uncontrolled Environment on NIR Iris Recognition

In this section, the influence of uncontrolled environmental scenario on the performance of
NIR iris recognition systems is evaluated. The proposed MUIPAD database is utilized to
compare the performance of iris recognition systems on images acquired indoor controlled
environment and outdoor uncontrolled environment. For evaluation purposes, two iris
recognition systems are utilized: VeriEye1 , a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) system and
OSIRIS V4.1 [37], an open-source iris recognition software.

3.1.1

Experimental Protocol

To examine the influence of uncontrolled environment on NIR based iris recognition, a gallery
set is created comprising one real iris image per class which has been acquired indoors during
the first session (70 images in total). Next, the following two probe sets are created for
contrasting indoor and outdoor real iris images and the results for Session-I, Session-II, and
Combined Session (samples of Session-I and Session-II together) are summarized in Table
3.1:
• Probe-Real-Indoor: Comprises real iris images captured indoors in controlled illumination scenario across the two sessions.
• Probe-Real-Outdoor: Consists of real iris images acquired in the uncontrolled outdoor
environment in the two sessions.
1

www.neurotechnology.com/verieye.html
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Table 3.1: Performance (Equal Error Rate %) of iris recognition systems in the presence of
uncontrolled environment and textured contact lens using (a) VeriEye COTS iris recognition
system and (b) OSIRIS iris recognition system.
Probe-Real-Indoor

Probe-Real-Outdoor

Session-I
Session-II
Combined Session

0.58
2.46
2.63
Probe-Lens-Indoor

4.95
3.56
3.29
Probe-Lens-Outdoor

Session-I
Session-II
Combined Session

11.52
12.89
12.21

15.20
13.30
12.49

(a) VeriEye

Probe-Real-Indoor

Probe-Real-Outdoor

5.44
13.62
12.21

17.87
15.45
15.01

Probe-Lens-Indoor

Probe-Lens-Outdoor

17.27
18.17
15.74

21.58
18.83
20.55

Session-I
Session-II
Combined Session

Session-I
Session-II
Combined Session

(b) OSIRIS V4.1 [37]

3.1.2

Experimental Results

The equal error rates (EER) values of the two experimental protocols described above are
analyzed to compare the effect of environmental conditions on iris recognition. As seen in
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1, it is observed that the Probe-Real-Indoor yields the lower EER value
as compared to Probe-Real-Outdoor for both, VeriEye and OSIRIS. This EER value obtained
using real to real iris image matching which are acquired indoors (Session-I) serves as the
baseline for subsequent analysis. Upon analyzing Probe-Real-Outdoor values, the same-
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(a) VeriEye
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(b) OSIRIS V4.1 [37]

Figure 3.1: ROC curves illustrating the influence of uncontrolled environment and textured
contact lens on the performance of iris recognition systems on the combined session.
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session EER increases by 1.10%-4.37% for VeriEye and 1.83%-12.43% for OSIRIS with
respect to the baseline. This increase in error rates can be attributed to the challenges added
by the uncontrolled environment in images acquired outdoors due to varying illumination
and other environmental factors. This highlights the need to develop better iris recognition
systems which can operate in both controlled and uncontrolled environmental scenarios.

3.2

Effect of Textured Contact Lens on NIR Iris Recognition

Next, the effect of textured contact lens on NIR iris recognition algorithms is examined.
The artificial patterns on textured lenses can lead to misclassifications. Hence, a thorough
examination is necessary to evaluate how it may affect the performance of recognition
systems, specifically in the uncontrolled environment.

3.2.1

Experimental Protocol

The same gallery set comprising one real iris image per class acquired indoors is chosen
for this experiment. Two different probes are considered: (i) Probe-Lens-Indoor constitutes
textured lens images captured indoors with controlled environment across the two sessions,
and (ii) Probe-Lens-Outdoor comprises textured lens images captured outdoors in the two
sessions. The two probe sets are evaluated using VeriEye and OSIRIS and the results are
analyzed subsequently.
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3.2.2

Experimental Results

As shown in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1, a consistent decrease in performance for both the
iris recognition systems as compared to the baseline is observed when the subjects wear
textured contact lens. These textured contact lenses conceal the original iris pattern leading
to poor matching performance. For VeriEye system, a decrease of 11% is observed in the
Probe-Lens-Indoor experiment as compared to when the subjects were not wearing any lenses
indoors. Similar trends are observed for OSIRIS system with a decrease in performance of
4-12% in the outdoors and indoors experiment. The results highlight the critical nature of
presentation attacks due to textured contact lenses which can be used to easily circumvent
iris recognition systems.

3.3

Effect on Visible Spectrum Iris Recognition

In the previous section, the impact of textured contact lens and unconstrained environment
on traditional NIR iris recognition systems is analyzed. In this section, the first study which
analyzes the effect of textured contact lens and unconstrained environmental conditions on
the performance of visible spectrum based iris recognition is presented.

3.3.1

Iris Recognition Algorithms for Evaluation

The first step in the iris recognition pipeline is the segmentation of the iris region in the
input image. For this purpose, three existing algorithms are utilized: OSIRIS v4.1 [37], total
variation (TV) based algorithm [44], and IrisSeg [13]. OSIRIS V4.1 [37] is an open-source
iris recognition software and has been employed for visible spectrum iris segmentation by
Raja et al. [34]. TV-based segmentation algorithm [44] is proposed by Zhao and Kumar for
segmenting unconstrained iris images including visible spectrum and they have demonstrated
21
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superior performance on databases such as UBIRIS.v2 [32] as compared to other approaches.
IrisSeg [13] has been recently introduced specifically for segmenting non-ideal irises. Out
of these three approaches, the TV-based algorithm yields the best segmentation outputs.
Both OSIRIS and IrisSeg are not able to detect the iris-pupil boundary, particularly, in the
images that are captured outdoors. It should be noted that various color channels were also
explored to enhance segmentation outputs. It is observed that there is a significant decrease
in the overall contrast between the pupil and iris region in the images collected in the visible
spectrum. This significantly reduces the segmentation performance of the tested algorithms
and in many cases, the entire iris is marked as the pupil region. Figure 3.2 demonstrates some
sample segmentation outputs and Hence, there is a need to develop better iris segmentation
algorithms for unconstrained visible spectrum iris images.
As the goal of this experiment is to compute baseline iris recognition performance to
determine the effect of the presence of textured contact lens and environmental variations,
feature extraction and matching are performed using the classical iris recognition approach
by Masek and Kovesi [27] after segmenting the iris region. This is similar to the approach
followed by Zhao and Kumar [44] for visible spectrum iris recognition. Feature extraction is
performed by normalizing the segmented iris into rectangular images followed by computation of 1D log-Gabor filters. The templates are created by quantization of these features to
four levels and are matched using Hamming distance. For investigating the performance of
unconstrained visible spectrum iris recognition, a commercial-off-the-shelf system (VeriEye)
is also utilized. However, it failed to segment the iris region in the majority of the images.

3.3.2

Experimental Protocol

The proposed UVCLI database has real and textured contact lens images of each subject
captured indoors and outdoors across two sessions. An experimental protocol is designed to
22

Indoor Real Iris

Outdoor Real Iris

Indoor Contact Lens Iris

Outdoor Contact Lens Iris

3.3 Effect on Visible Spectrum Iris Recognition

Figure 3.2: Sample segmentation outputs of visible iris images from the proposed UVCLI
database using OSIRIS V4.1 [37] (row 1) and TV based segmentation algorithm [44] (row
2). (Best viewed in color)
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Table 3.2: Iris recognition performance (EER%) on the proposed UVCLI database.
Session

Environment

Real

Textured Contact Lens

Combined

Indoor
Outdoor

19.55
37.65

38.35
42.57

Session 1

Indoor
Outdoor

13.44
43.39

40.70
40.97

Session 2

Indoor
Outdoor

19.97
33.55

37.76
39.70

evaluate the effect of textured contact lenses on the performance of iris recognition system.
In this experiment, one real (without contact lens) image per class acquired indoors in the
first session are combined to form the gallery. This experiment simulates the scenario where
the iris images used for enrollment are acquired in a controlled illumination setting. The
remaining visible spectrum iris images are utilized to form the probe set to analyze the impact
of textured contact lenses on visible iris recognition.

3.3.3

Experimental Results

Table 3.2 and Figure 3.3 show the visible spectrum based iris recognition accuracy on the
experimental protocol described above and the results are analyzed subsequently.
As seen in Figure 3.3 and the Combined row of Table 3.2, the best iris recognition
performance is observed when the probe contains real images. On further analysis, it is
observed that the probe containing images captured indoors in the same session as the
gallery (session 1) yields the lowest EER of 13.44%. This result serves as the baseline
for the subsequent comparisons as this gallery-probe set pair is expected to have minimum
intra-class variations.
On the other hand, when the real gallery images captured indoors are matched with real
probe images captured in an outdoor environment, there is a drastic decrease in the iris
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Figure 3.3: ROC curves showing the performance of visible iris recognition on the proposed
UVCLI database (Session 1 and Session 2 combined).
recognition performance. It is observed that approximately 30% increase in EER (session 1
real outdoor) and 20% increase in EER (session 2 real outdoor) in these cases with respect to
the baseline. This highlights the challenging nature of the iris images captured in outdoor
environment due to factors such as specular reflection and varying illumination. The 10%
EER increase in session 1 outdoor real images probe as compared to session 2 outdoor real
images probe can be attributed to the fact that majority of session 1 outdoor samples are
acquired in daylight, which can lead to specular reflections and other illumination issues in
the acquired images.
Next, the effect of the presence of textured contact lens in the probe set is analyzed and
the EER for the same is shown in the rightmost column of Table 3.2. It is observed that
textured contact lenses reduce the performance of visible spectrum iris recognition system
as compared to the baseline. The EER of textured contact lenses probe images ranged from
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37.76% to 40.97% EER in different environments and sessions. This result illustrates that
textured contact lenses significantly conceal the original iris pattern which in turn, can be
utilized by individuals to conceal their identity.
In summary, these experiments highlight that textured contact lens significantly degrades
the performance of iris recognition system in the visible spectrum. This can lead to intentional
or unintentional concealment of identity. Additionally, it is very challenging to segment
visible spectrum iris images acquired in an outdoor environment due to varying illumination
conditions and future visible spectrum iris recognition algorithms need to account for these
challenges.

3.4

Textured Contact Lens for Identity Impersonation and
Obfuscation

The previous experiments highlight the scope of improvement in designing algorithms for
recognizing iris images in the outdoor environment as well as textured contact lens images.
Due to the increasing popularity of textured contact lenses, it is imperative to study if these
lenses can be utilized intentionally or unintentionally for hiding own identity or impersonating
someone else’s identity. However, no study has been undertaken to analyze the security
implications of wearing textured contact lens at the time of enrollment. Hence, we present the
first quantitative analysis of the efficacy of textured contact lenses on identity impersonation.

3.4.1

Experimental Protocol

This experiment is undertaken to understand how current iris recognition systems perform
if subjects wear textured contact lenses during the enrollment phase. In this experiment,
all the images of subjects wearing textured contact lenses are considered. The scores from
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Enrollment Image
Subject A wearing Gray
Freshlook Textured Lens

Query Image
Subject A wearing Gray
Freshlook Textured Lens

Query Image
Subject B wearing Gray
Freshlook Textured Lens

Query Image
Subject A wearing Blue
Aryan Textured Lens

Figure 3.4: Illustrating sample instances of identity impersonation and identity obfuscation
using textured contact lenses.
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the pairwise matching of iris images by VeriEye system are computed and the following
scenarios are created and shown in Figure 3.4:
• SameSubject-SameLens: Let us assume that subject A1 wears textured contact lens T1
for enrollment. This experiment replicates the scenario where at the time of the query,
the subject A1 is wearing the same textured lens T1 as the enrollment phase.
• SameSubject-DifferentLens: This depicts the obfuscation scenario where the subject
may try to intentionally or unintentionally evade recognition. In this case, subject A1
wears a different lens T2 than the one worn during the enrollment phase (lens type T1 ).
• DifferentSubject-SameLens: This scenario depicts the impersonation scenario where
an attacker may utilize textured contact lenses for impersonating a subject enrolled in
the system. For instance, subject A2 wears the same textured lens T1 as subject A1 and
aims to impersonate as A1 .

3.4.2

Experimental Results

To evaluate the effectiveness of textured contact lenses in obfuscation and impersonation,
scores obtained using VeriEye in each of the three scenarios described above are analyzed.
To mimic real-world scenarios, the score value at 0.01% False Accept Rate (FAR) is chosen
as the threshold from the Probe-Real-Indoor baseline experiment. This strict threshold is
chosen to minimize false positives. All the scores exceeding this threshold are treated as
Table 3.3: Percentage of scores labeled as genuine by VeriEye for different scenarios of
identity impersonation and identity obfuscation.
SameSubject
SameLens

SameSubject
DifferentLens

DifferentSubject
SameLens

73.46

37.17

2.26
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genuine and the results are shown in Table 3.3. It can be seen in the SameSubject-SameLens
scenario, when the subjects wear the same textured contact lenses as the enrollment phase,
73.46% of the match scores are considered genuine and the remaining 26.54% scores are
labeled as an impostor at 0.01% FAR. The result highlights that wearing lenses during the
enrollment phase may result in a larger number of false positives during the recognition
phase. However, the potential of evasion through obfuscation or impersonation may be a
strong motivation to wear such textured contact lenses during the enrollment phase.
For the identity impersonation experiment (DifferentSubject-SameLens), two different
subjects wear the same textured contact lenses. It is observed that even at a hard threshold of
0.01% FAR, 2.26% of the scores (1,292 instances) are considered genuine by the VeriEye
matcher. This high number of false positives reveals a critical security concern where an
attacker may gain unauthorized access using textured contact lenses. Hence, this experiment
illustrates the potential security implications of identity impersonation when an individual
wears the same type of textured contact lenses as another subject enrolled in the system.
The analysis of the obfuscation experiment, depicted in SameSubject-DifferentLens scenario, shows that more than 62.83% of the scores belonging to genuine users are considered
as impostors. This result is attributed due to the fact that the subject is wearing a different
textured contact lens during the matching phase. Thus, by wearing a different textured
contact lens, an attacker may have a high chance to evade/conceal their original identity.
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Chapter 4
Benchmarking Existing Textured
Contact Lens Detection Algorithms
The previous chapter illustrates that perpetrators may utilize textured contact lenses for
identity impersonation as well as obfuscation. It is also demonstrated that uncontrolled
environmental variations deteriorate the verification accuracy of iris recognition systems.
Hence, it is imperative to evaluate the efficacy of iris presentation attack detection (PAD)
algorithms in detecting textured contact lens as well as examine the influence of uncontrolled
environmental scenarios. In this chapter, different PAD algorithms for detecting textured
contact lenses are evaluated on the proposed MUIPAD and UVCLI databases.

4.1

Performance on Mobile Uncontrolled Iris Presentation
Attack Database

The following iris PAD algorithms are utilized for evaluation purposes:

30

4.1 Performance on Mobile Uncontrolled Iris Presentation Attack Database
• Local Binary Patterns (LBP): LBP features [29] are utilized to encode texture variations.
These features have been popularly used by many researchers to discriminate between
real and attack images [14]. In the experiments, LBP features with radius = 1 and
neighbors = 8 are used in conjunction with Support Vector Machine (SVM) [6] as the
classifier.
• Weighted Local Binary Patterns (W-LBP): Zhang et al. [43] proposed to encode
texture patterns using W-LBP features along with SVM classifier for classifying
textured contact lens iris images. The parameter values defined in [43] are utilized for
experimental purposes.
• DESIST: This state-of-the-art iris presentation attack framework [22] for detecting
multiple presentation attacks, including textured contact lenses and print attack images.
It comprises of structural and textural features with neural network classifier for
distinguishing attack images from real iris images. The model configuration described
in [22] is followed.
• AlexNet: AlexNet [24] is a deep convolutional neural network which was developed
for image classification. It consists of five convolutional layers followed by three fully
connected layers. In this research, pre-trained AlexNet features are utilized with SVM
classifier to encode and classify texture patterns in the presented iris images.
For subsequent iris PAD experiments, five-fold cross-validation is performed on the
proposed MUIPAD database such that the subjects in the training and testing partitions are
disjoint.
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Table 4.1: Iris presentation attack detection performance on the proposed Mobile Uncontrolled Iris Presentation Attack Database (MUIPAD). The error values are reported in %.
Algorithm

4.1.1

Total Error

APCER

BPCER

LBP [29]

13.00

15.36

1.23

W-LBP [43]

23.36

23.90

20.69

DESIST [22]

16.36

18.17

7.32

AlexNet [24]

10.21

11.79

2.28

Benchmarking PAD performance

For studying the effect of varying environment and textured contact lens on presentation
attack, the performance of existing iris PAD algorithms is evaluated on the proposed MUIPAD
database. The proposed database is split into training and testing sets using 5-fold cross
validation with disjoint subjects and PAD results are reported using the following metrics
[17]:
• Total Error: Rate of all misclassified iris images
• Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER): Rate of misclassified attack
iris images
• Bonafide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER): Rate of misclassified real
iris images
In this experiment, train and test data contain real and textured lens iris images captured both
indoor and outdoor across different sessions. The result of this experiment is summarized in
Table 4.1.
It is observed that using features obtained from deep CNN based AlexNet [24] surpasses
other existing PAD algorithms and achieves the lowest total error of 10.21%. It outperforms
other approaches by at least 2.79% with respect to the total error metric. It can be inferred that
deep learning based features are able to encode discriminatory information for classifying
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Table 4.2: Iris presentation attack detection performance (in %) of AlexNet [24] on iris images
acquired in unseen environment with textured contact lens. In the Benchmark experiment,
training and testing partitions contain real and textured lens iris images captured indoors and
outdoors across different sessions.
Experiment
Benchmark
Indoor-Train-OutdoorTest
Outdoor-Train-IndoorTest

Total Error

APCER

BPCER

6.88

7.30

6.44

25.09

4.68

45.41

7.36

5.01

9.64

real and attacked iris images. Upon further analysis, it is seen that 11.79% of attacked iris
images and 2.28% of real iris images are misclassified by AlexNet features [24].
As AlexNet [24] based iris PAD algorithm yields the minimum total error rate on the
proposed MUIPAD database, it is selected for performing the subsequent analysis. Studies in
the literature [15] have demonstrated that print attack images are easier to detect. Therefore,
the focus is on distinguishing textured contact lens images from real iris images. For this
Real vs. Textured Contact Lens experiment, training and testing partitions with and without
textured contact lens iris images are utilized and remove the print attack images. AlexNet
feature [24] based algorithm yields 6.88% total error with APCER of 7.30% and BPCER of
6.44% for this experiment. The comparison of APCER values in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2
shows that intra-class variation in the attack class increases by including print attacks as well
as textured contact lens images.

4.1.2

Evaluating the Effect of Unseen Environment

After benchmarking the performance of iris PAD algorithms on the proposed MUIPAD
database, an in-depth analysis of the effect of the unseen environment is performed on the
best performing PAD algorithm (AlexNet [24]). In this experiment, the training and testing
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Table 4.3: Iris presentation attack detection performance (in %) of AlexNet [24] to showcase
the effect of unseen textured contact lens manufacturer.
Unseen Manufacturer

Total Error

APCER

BPCER

Freshlook

7.88

7.88

7.89

Colorblends

3.81

5.52

2.08

Bausch + Lomb

18.44

34.28

2.32

Aryan

0.00

0.00

0.00

Celebration

6.25

0.00

12.50

partitions created for Real vs. Textured Contact Lens experiment are refined to create the
following scenarios. It should be noted that for both the scenarios, the training and testing
sets contain disjoint (unseen) subjects.
• Indoor-Train-Outdoor-Test: In this scenario, the training data contains real and attack
images acquired in controlled indoor settings while the testing data contains real
and attack images acquired in the uncontrolled outdoor environment. This scenario
evaluates the performance of iris PAD when the training is performed using controlled
images while the testing contains unseen environmental variations.
• Outdoor-Train-Indoor-Test: In this experimental scenario, the training set comprises
real and attack images acquired outdoors while the testing set consists of real and
attack iris images acquired indoors.
The results of the experimental scenarios are summarized in Indoor-Train-Outdoor-Test
and Outdoor-Train-Indoor-Test rows of Table 4.2. Evaluation of the above scenarios reveals
that when the iris PAD algorithm is trained using only indoor iris images and is tested on
the outdoor iris images, an increase in error rates is witnessed in comparison to when the
algorithm is trained using both indoor and outdoor images in Real vs. Textured Contact Lens
experiment. A similar trend is observed when AlexNet [24] is trained with images acquired
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outdoors and tested on images acquired indoors. The increase in error upon encountering
iris images which are captured in unseen environmental scenarios illustrate the need to
incorporate iris images captured in different environmental settings for developing accurate
iris PAD models.

4.1.3

Examining the Impact of Unseen Textured Contact Lens Manufacturer

As seen in Figure 3.4, the patterns of the textured contact lenses may vary from manufacturer
to manufacturer, even if the color is the same. In this experiment, the efficacy of deep learning
based iris presentation attack detection algorithm (AlexNet [24]) is analyzed in detecting
textured contact lenses belonging to unknown manufacturers. For this, the textured contact
lenses have been categorized into five groups based on the lens manufacturer type: Freshlook,
Colorblends, Bausch + Lomb, Aryan, and Celebration. The experimental setup involves
performing a five-fold ‘leave one manufacturer out’ protocol where textured contact lens
images belonging to an unseen manufacturer are used in the testing while the training set
contains iris images belonging to the remaining manufacturers. It is ensured that subjects in
the training and testing partitions are disjoint.
The results of this experiment are compiled in Table 4.3. It is seen that when the testing
set contained unseen iris images from Bausch + Lomb manufacturer, AlexNet [24] based
iris PAD algorithm yields the highest total error of 18.44%. This can be associated with
realistic looking contact lens patterns from this manufacturer, making it more challenging to
distinguish from real iris images. This is also evident from the highest APCER of 34.28% for
Bausch + Lomb lenses. On the other hand, AlexNet [24] based iris PAD algorithm yields
the lowest total error of 0% for Aryan textured contact lenses which may be attributed to
artificial patterns on the contact lenses of this manufacturer. These results emphasize that
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while designing iris PAD algorithms for textured contact lens detection, there is a need to
include lenses from different manufacturers. It also highlights that the textured contact lens
detection performance may vary for different manufacturers.

4.2

Performance on Unconstrained Visible Spectrum Contact Lens Iris Database

As it is crucial to design algorithms for detecting textured contact lens in a given visible
spectrum iris image, in this section, the performance of the three existing PAD algorithms is
investigated:
• DESIST [22]
• Multiscale BSIF [33]
• Weighted LBP [43]

4.2.1

Experimental Setup

For the purpose of iris presentation attack detection, five-fold cross-validation is performed
on the proposed UVCLI database such that the subjects in the training and testing partitions
are unseen. Two experimental protocols are developed which are explained subsequently:
Unseen Subject Partition: In this experiment, all visible spectrum real and textured
contact lens (attack) images of the training partition subjects are used for training the PAD
models. Similarly, all the images of the subjects in the testing partitions are utilized for
evaluating the PAD performance.
Unseen Subject Partition and Environment: The objective of this experiment is to evaluate
the efficacy of iris presentation attack detection algorithms which are trained only with
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Table 4.4: Iris Presentation Attack Detection Performance on the proposed UVCLI database.
(a) Unseen Subject Partition

Algorithm

Mean PAD Accuracy (%)

DESIST [22]

82.85 ± 3.73

Weighted LBP [43]

78.49 ± 3.15

Multiscale BSIF [33]

63.30 ± 3.31

(b) Unseen Subject Partition and Environment

Algorithm

Mean PAD Accuracy (%)

DESIST [22]

74.60 ± 5.33

Weighted LBP [43]

73.88 ± 2.17

Multiscale BSIF [33]

56.29 ± 8.28

constrained iris images captured indoors. In this experiment, the training set comprises
indoor real and attack images captured in the first session, while the testing set comprises first
session outdoor, second session indoor, and second session outdoor images of the subjects in
the testing partition.

4.2.2

Experimental Results

The results of iris presentation attack detection on the proposed UVCLI database are summarized in Table 4.4 and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves are presented in
Figure 4.1.

Results of Unseen Subject Partition
Upon analyzing the results of Unseen Subject Partition iris PAD experiment in Table 4.4a
and Figure 4.1a, it is observed that DESIST framework [22] outperforms other approaches by
at least 4% in distinguishing between visible spectrum real and attack (textured contact lens)
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Figure 4.1: ROC curves showing the performance of visible spectrum iris PAD algorithms
on the proposed UVCLI database.
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images. The combination of structural and textural features in DESIST is able to encode
discriminatory information for iris presentation attack detection.
The performance of iris PAD algorithms are further analyzed with respect to the percentage of real and textured contact lens (attack) images correctly classified in Unseen Subject
Partition iris PAD experiment. Using DESIST, 85.00% of the real images are correctly classified as compared to 79.31% and 62.07% by multiscale BSIF and weighted LBP, respectively.
On the other hand, 80.79% of attack images are correctly classified by DESIST. In other
words, around 20% of attack images may be incorrectly classified as real by state-of-the-art
iris PAD algorithm.

Results of Unseen Subject Partition and Environment
For analyzing the effect of environmental variations in visible spectrum iris PAD, the results
of Unseen Subject Partition and Environment are evaluated. In this experiment, the training
set consists of only real and textured contact lens images captured in an indoor setting with
controlled illumination. Table 4.4b and Figure 4.1b illustrate the results of this experiment.
It is observed that the PAD performance of all three algorithms decreases by 5-8% in Unseen
Subject Partition and Environment iris PAD experiment. This can be attributed to the fact
that the algorithms are not trained on visible samples that have been acquired in an outdoor
environment and did not account for variations such as considerable illumination changes.
This showcases that iris PAD algorithms need to be trained with real-world unconstrained
iris images.
Additionally, iris PAD analysis of DESIST is performed on session-wise indoor and
outdoor visible images. It is observed that second session images which are captured indoors
are classified with 82.98% PAD accuracy as compared to 65.53% and 73.73% for first session
outdoor and second session outdoor images respectively. The higher classification accuracy
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of second session indoor images can be associated with the fact that the DESIST algorithm
is trained with images captured in an indoor environment. Also, it is seen that first session
outdoor images are classified with lower accuracy as compared to second session outdoor
images. One reason for this can be that the data acquired in the first session outdoor has three
times more images collected in sunny weather as compared to the second session. Capturing
visible spectrum images in sunny weather can lead to more ambient light and reflection, thus,
making it difficult to discern real iris images.
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Chapter 5
Proposed DenseNet based Algorithm for
Iris Presentation Attack Detection
In the literature of textured contact lens detection, different handcrafted feature based solutions [9, 21, 22] have been developed. Recently, different deep learning approaches have
been successfully used in various supervised and unsupervised machine learning tasks. More
specifically, DenseNet based convolutional neural network architectures have shown remarkable performance in several image classification tasks [16]. However, there is no existing
work in the literature of iris presentation attack detection or textured contact lens detection
which employs this architecture. Motivated by this, the main contributions of this chapter
are:
• Proposed a novel framework utilizing DenseNet based deep learning architecture for
NIR based iris presentation attack detection.
• Demonstrated results on the Combined Iris database, prepared by combining the
images from multiple publicly available databases. It contains more than 270,000 iris
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images with multiple presentation attacks and was created to successfully train a deep
learning based model.
• Compared the performance with several state-of-the-art PAD algorithms.

5.1

Proposed DensePAD Algorithm for Iris Presentation
Attack Detection

As shown in Figure 5.1, in DenseNet, each layer is connected to every other layer in a
feed-forward fashion as compared to traditional convolutional networks where there is a
single connection between each layer and its subsequent layers. For an input image x, the ith
layer obtains the concatenation of the feature representations from all the previous layer as
input. Thus, the output xi from layer i is computed as:

xi = Li ([x0 , x1 , . . . , xi−1 ])

(5.1)

where Li refers to the non-linear transformations such as batch normalization and pooling.
The unique architecture of the DenseNet network strengthens feature propagation, encourages
feature reuse, and substantially reduces the number of parameters in the trained model.
In the proposed DenseNet based architecture (DensePAD) for detecting textured contact
lens images, iris images of 120 x 160 are provided as input. In this architecture, a DenseNet
of depth 22 with three densely connected blocks is proposed to classify an input iris image
as real or attack (containing textured contact lens). Every dense block is followed by a
transition block that consists of a convolution layer and pooling layer to reduce the size of
the output. Each dense block in our algorithm consists of six convolution blocks where every
convolution block is densely connected. A convolution block itself consists of a convolution
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Input Iris Image
Convolution

Dense Block 1
Convolution
Max Pooling

Dense Block 2
Convolution
Max Pooling

Dense Block 3
Max Pooling
Linear
Real vs.
Attack

Figure 5.1: Architecture of proposed DensePAD algorithm for textured contact lens detection.
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Table 5.1: Characteristics of the Combined Iris Database and its constituent databases.
Database
LivDet2013 (Warsaw Subset)
[41]

No. of Iris Images

Type(s) of Iris Images

1,667

Print and Real
Real, Print, Textured
Contact Lens, and
Synthetic Iris
Real and Textured
Contact Lens
Real and Textured
Contact Lens

Combined Spoofing Database
[22]

21,525

NDCLD-2013 [40]

4,200 (LG4000) and
900 (AD100)

NDCLD-2015 [8]

7,300

ND-Iris-0405

64,980
117,106 (LG2200) &
29,845 (LG4000)

Real

ND-TimeLapseIris-2012

6,796

Real

CASIA-Iris-Thousand

20,000

Real

274,319

Real, Print, Textured
Contact Lens, and
Synthetic Iris

ND-CrossSensor-Iris-2013

Combined Iris Database

Real

layer, batch normalization layer, convolution layer and a dropout layer. A growth rate of 12
is used which determines the rate at which the concatenated filters grow.

5.2
5.2.1

Experimental Evaluation
Combined Iris Database

Various iris presentation attack databases exist in the literature which contain iris images
pertaining to a specific presentation attack. However, there is a scarcity of iris databases
consisting of multiple presentation attacks. Kohli et al. [22] created Combined Spoofing
Dataset (CSD) which was a combination of multiple publicly available spoofing databases. It
contained 11,368 attack iris images and 9,325 real iris images from different iris databases.
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Inspired by CSD, the largest iris presentation attack database, Combined Iris database,
containing more than 270,000 real and attacked iris images is presented. A key feature of this
database is that it comprises iris images acquired from different sensors, subjects of different
ethnicities, and multiple presentation attacks. The constituent databases of the Combined Iris
database are:
• LivDet2013 (Warsaw Subset) [41] contains 1,667 real and printed iris images.
• Combined Spoofing Database (CSD) [22] comprises various iris presentation attack
images such as textured contact lenses, print attack, and synthetic iris images as well as
real iris images from different databases [12, 15, 25, 40]. The total number of images
is 21,525.
• NDCLD-2013 [40] consists of real and attacked images acquired from two sensors:
LG4000 and AD100. 4,200 images have been captured with LG4000 iris sensor while
900 images are acquired with AD100 iris sensor is 900. This database contains iris
images with textured contact lens iris images from different manufacturers.
• NDCLD-2015 [8] contains iris images with textured contact lens and real iris images.
The total number of images in the database is 7,300.
The above-mentioned databases contain both, real and attacked iris images. For increasing the real samples in the Combined Iris database, the following databases are also
added which contain only real iris images: ND-Iris-0405 [4], ND-CrossSensor-Iris-2013
[5], ND-TimeLapseIris-2012 [2], and CASIA-Iris-Thousand [30]. The characteristics of the
Combined Iris database and its constituent databases are summarized in Table 5.1. Figure 5.2
shows sample iris images from different constituent databases of the Combined Iris database
along with their image type (real or attack).
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Type: Contact Lens

Database: NDCLD13

Type: Real

Database: ND-TimeLapseIris-2012

Type: Real

Database: CASIA-Iris-Thousand

Type: Real
Type: Print

Type: Real
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Type: Real

Type: Synthetic

Database: ND-0405

Type: Real

Type: Real

Type: Contact Lens
Database: NDCLD13
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Database: Combined Spoofing Database

Type: Print

Database: ND-CrossSensor-Iris-2013

Type: Real

Database: LivDet 2013 (Warsaw)

Type: Real

5.2 Experimental Evaluation

Figure 5.2: Sample iris image types from various constituent databases of the Combined Iris
database.

5.2 Experimental Evaluation
Table 5.2: The number of real and attacked iris images in each fold for the Combined Iris
database.
Fold
1
2
3
4
5

Training Partition
Real
Attack
210,339 9,760
208,973 9,513
209,282 9,324
209,633 9,427
211,601 9,424

Testing Partition
Real
Attack
51,698 2,522
53,064 2,769
52,755 2,958
52,404 2,855
50,436 2,858

Table 5.3: Iris presentation attack detection performance (%) of the proposed DensePAD and
existing algorithms on the Combined Iris database.
Algorithm
LBP [15]
WLBP [43]
DESIST [22]
Proposed DensePAD

5.2.2

Total Error
22.94
52.75
4.13
0.90

APCER
80.00
48.18
77.48
16.57

BPCER
20.00
53.00
0.20
0.06

Experimental Setup

The performance of the proposed DensePAD algorithm is evaluated on the Combined Iris
database. For experimental evaluation, each constituent database is split into five crossvalidation folds and merged to form the five folds of the Combined Iris database. It is ensured
that the subjects in the training and testing partitions are disjoint in every fold. Table 5.2
shows the number of real and attacked iris samples in the training and testing partitions of
each fold. Comparative analysis is performed with existing PAD algorithms: LBP [15] ,
WLBP [43], and DESIST [22].

5.2.3

Results on Combined Iris Database

The average total error, APCER, and BPCER values across the five cross-validation folds of
the Combined Iris database are summarized in Table 5.3. It is observed that the proposed
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Table 5.4: Iris presentation attack detection performance of the proposed DensePAD algorithm on the proposed Mobile Uncontrolled Iris Presentation Attack Database (MUIPAD).
The error values are reported in %.
Algorithm

Total Error

APCER

BPCER

LBP [29]

13.00

15.36

1.23

W-LBP [43]

23.36

23.90

20.69

DESIST [22]

16.36

18.17

7.32

AlexNet [24]

10.21

11.79

2.28

Proposed DensePAD

9.06

10.15

2.15

DensePAD algorithm yields the best results with a minimum total error of 0.90%. It achieves
16.57% error in detecting presentation attack iris images and 0.06% error in detecting real
iris images.
Comparative analysis of the proposed DensePAD algorithm is also performed with
existing iris PAD algorithms: LBP [15], WLBP [43], and DESIST [22]. It is observed that
the DensePAD algorithm outperforms the existing algorithms on the Combined Iris database.
It achieves 3 − 21% lower total error as compared to LBP, WLBP, and DESIST. With respect
to detecting attacked iris images, DensePAD achieves 32 − 63% lower APCER as compared
to existing algorithms. Similarly, in detecting real iris images, it yields at least 0.14% lower
BPCER as compared to the other algorithms.

5.2.4

Results on Proposed MUIPAD

The performance of the proposed DensePAD algorithm is also analyzed on the proposed
Mobile Uncontrolled Iris Presentation Attack Database (MUIPAD). For this experiment,
MUIPAD is utilized as the testing set while the algorithm is trained on the Combined Iris
database. For comparative analysis, the performance of LBP, WLBP, DESIST, and AlexNet
is also evaluated and the results are summarized in Table 5.4.

48

5.2 Experimental Evaluation
With respect to the total error, it is observed that the proposed DensePAD algorithm
demonstrates improved performance as compared to the other PAD algorithms on MUIPAD.
It also achieves the lowest APCER value of 10.15% and it yields the lowest BPCER value of
2.15%. These results demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed DensePAD in detecting iris
presentation attacks in MUIPAD.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
Increasing deployment of smartphones has increased the research in mobile iris devices.
Due to their nature, these mobile devices are also utilized in uncontrolled environmental
scenarios. At the same time, visible spectrum based iris recognition has emerged into an
active area of research. These scenarios have warranted the development of reliable iris
recognition algorithms for such uncontrolled environments. Additionally, this growth in
iris recognition technology has led to elevated concern regarding its susceptibility towards
presentation attacks.
This thesis presented a detailed analysis of the effect of textured contact lenses on iris
recognition in the uncontrolled environment. For this, a novel Mobile Uncontrolled Iris
Presentation Attack Database (MUIPAD) is presented which consists of more than 10,000
iris images captured in an indoor and outdoor environment using a mobile iris sensor. The
database comprises iris images belonging to subjects wearing textured contact lens and
without wearing contact lenses (real) along with corresponding print attack images. In
this thesis, a detailed analysis is performed to investigate the impact of textured contact
lenses on identity impersonation. The results demonstrate that a perpetrator can impersonate
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the identity of an enrolled subject by wearing the same textured contact lens. This result
highlights a key security implication of textured contact lenses.
In this thesis, the impact of textured contact lenses in an uncontrolled environment in the
visible spectrum is also studied. However, very few databases exist for iris recognition in
visible spectrum which are acquired in an unconstrained manner. At the same time, similar
to the NIR spectrum, iris recognition in the visible spectrum is also vulnerable to different
types of presentation attacks. These experimental results demonstrate that there is a need
to actively investigate and mitigate the effect of presentation attacks in iris recognition for
the visible spectrum. To promote the research in the area of presentation attack detection of
textured contact lenses, the first contact lens database in the visible spectrum is introduced,
named as UVCLI database. The database contains over 3,800 real and textured contact lens
images belonging to 70 iris classes. This database is acquired with varying unconstrained
environmental scenarios and is multi-session in nature. Due to these variations, the database
can also be utilized for research in iris recognition in the unconstrained visible spectrum.
Using the UVCLI database, the first detailed analysis of the effect of textured contact
lenses on iris recognition in the visible spectrum is presented. It is observed that textured
contact lenses degrade the unconstrained iris recognition performance by over 25% and thus,
may be utilized intentionally or unintentionally to attack existing iris recognition systems.
To analyze the efficacy of presentation attack detection algorithms on the UVCLI database,
three algorithms are utilized. The experimental evaluation highlights the need to develop
efficient algorithms for detecting contact lenses in the visible spectrum.
This thesis also presents a novel deep learning based algorithm, DensePAD, for detecting
real and attack iris images. The proposed DensePAD algorithm utilizes DenseNet based
convolutional neural network architecture to encode discriminatory features for real and
attack iris images. Its experimental evaluation on the proposed MUIPAD and combined iris
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database, containing more than 270,000 iris images, showcases its superior performance in
classifying real and attack iris images.
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